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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to dispel some myths associated with migrants in order to improve 
socio-economic appraisal of the consequences of the recent surge of migrants into Europe. We 
argue that: (i) the concern about loss of Christian cultural values is lacking in substance because 
compared to a relatively near historical epoch or era, very few European citizens do go to Church 
in contemporary Europe; (ii) the threat to European liberal institutions is falsifiable and 
statistically fragile because  it is not substantiated with significant evidence; (iii) the insignificant 
proportion of the Moslem population that is aligned with Islamic fundamentalism invalidates the 
hypothesis on importation of radical Islamic fundamentalism and (iv) the concern about social 
security burden is relevant only in the short-term because of Europe’s ageing population. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of migration is not new to any culture, society or community. Many civilizations 
began and flourished because of migration. There are many reasons why people migrate. These 
include economic migrants who flee poverty, seek employment and increased standard of living 
as well as non-economic migrants who move for family unification, seek protection as refugees, 
or for adventure. Castles et al.  (2005) consider migration as an integral part of human nature 
which is as old as humans themselves and dating back to the era of Homo sapiens from Africa 
100 000 years ago. Although migration is a very sensitive issue in most of the receiving 
countries, Castles et al. (2005) revealed that approximately only 185 million people had been 
outside their countries of origin which is only about 2% of the world’s population.  This means 
that although we see and think that too many people are leaving their countries, the numbers 
show that it is just a tip of the iceberg. Boyle et al. (1998) describe migration as the crossing of a 
boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period.  
 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines migration as the movement 
of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. 
According to the IOM, one in thirty-five persons is a migrant from the start of the 21
st
  century 
while in industrialised countries one in ten persons is a migrant. George (2013) highlighted that, 
industrialisation and migration are positively correlated as more people turn to migrate from 
rural to urban societies and from countries of low industrialisation to countries of high 
industrialisation. This explains why the number of immigrants into highly industrialised 
countries such as the European Union (EU) countries has only increased over the years. 
The present inquiry has two main objectives. First, it aims to assess myths surrounding 
the socio-economic effects of politico-economic migrants.  The term politico-economic is used 
to qualify migrants because migration objectives have been documented to be both economic and 
political (Hix & Noury, 2007, Asongu, 2014ab, 2015). Whereas political migrants flee their 
countries of origin for political reasons (e.g. absence of democracy, abuse of human rights and 
lack of press freedom), economic migrants are motivated essentially by the need to flee from 
poverty and unemployment. Myths that are assessed include, inter alia: (i) loss of Christian 
cultural values owing to a potential clash of civilisations with Europe’s historical/contemporary 
Christian values; (ii) threat to European liberal institutions; (iii) import of religious 
fundamentalism and (iv) substantial cost to social security.  
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 Second, we use hard stylized facts and evidence from the literature to clarify myths 
surrounding the socio-economic consequences of migration into the European Union. In essence, 
consistent with the highlighted myths, we argue that: (i) the concern about loss of Christian 
cultural values is lacking in substance because compared to a relatively near historical epoch or 
era, very few European citizens do go to Church in contemporary Europe; (ii) the threat to 
European liberal institutions is falsifiable and statistically fragile because  it is not substantiated 
with significant evidence; (iii) the insignificant proportion of the Moslem population aligned 
with Islamic fundamentalism invalidates the hypothesis on importation of radical Islamic 
fundamentalism and (iv) the concern about social security burden is relevant only in the short-
term because of Europe’s ageing population. 
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Various schools thought surrounding the 
debate are engaged in Section 2. Section 3 discusses socio-economic myths surrounding the 
recent upsurge of migrants into Europe. Section 4 debunks underlying myths while Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Schools of Thought and Arguments 
 In a bid to understand the socioeconomic effect of refugee migrants into the EU, we have 
briefly exploited the arguments provided by the conservatives and liberals in order to see through 
their lenses and separate facts from myths. The sole purpose of presenting these schools of 
thoughts is to give an understanding of their ideologies and how these ideologies affect people’s 
perception of refugees/migrants. Let us get one fact clear: the migration of people: be it as a 
result of persecution (refugees) or for economic reasons is inevitable. In fact, Castles and Miller 
(2009) pointed this current period of history as an age of migration. 
2.1 The Right Wing Political Spectrum (Conservatives)  
 The right wing ideology generalised claims to represent the people under a canopy of a 
homogenised ideal based on native ideologies, thus on traditional body politics (Wodak, 2015).  
Most anti-immigration parties in western European countries have in recent years experienced 
electoral lift-off (VanSpanje, 2010). They have had an increased record of success at the polls in 
recent years. This success comes partly with immigration from the Third world being top on the 
agenda (Betz, 1993).    These parties seek to preserve European cultures and heritage. These 
nationalist parties stand for the promotion of European Christian Values and the restriction of 
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immigrants. They are pushing for social security benefits for native European tax payers as 
opposed to immigrants or non-European.  
 The right wing ideologies started gaining grounds from the end of the Cold war in 1989, 
and breakthrough came with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA. The rise of Islamic terrorist 
organisations, the Euro crisis and global financial crisis are scenarios that have only brought fear 
in these regions and it is this fear that is being exploited (Wodak, 2015). Europe today as a result 
of these crises has seen the emergence of some far rights or extreme right parties, namely the:  
British National Party of Nick Griffin (Britain); Freedom Party of Geert Wilders (Netherlands); 
Lega Nord (Northern League) of Umberto Bossi (Italy); National Demokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) of Udo Voigt; Front National (National 
Front) of Marine Le Pen (France); and VlaamsBelang (Flemish Interest) of Bruno Valkeniers 
(Belgium). 
 
2.2 Left Wing Political Spectrum (Liberals) 
 In an ever changing globalised world, the proponents on the left argue that 
Multiculturalism and integration are strengths to every great nation. This school of thought 
argues that multiculturalism and integration are based on the core democratic values of liberty, 
equality, and unity or fraternity (Modood, 2013). The freedom of everyone to be able to move 
and settle where he or she pleases is stipulated in the international declaration of human rights. 
According to EU migration data for 2012, the population of the EU is ageing. There is concern 
that such ageing population of EU countries will have a very significant impact on social 
security. The left of course sees this as a solution to recruit and integrate young labour forces into 
the system as part of the solution in reducing government spending in the long term.    
 
2.3 Reconciliation of the Schools of Thoughts (Third Way) 
 In order to appease the right wings, it is necessary that refugees/migrants coming-in 
should be offered language and integration programs to allow them access to the educational 
system. This will of course increase government spending but in the long run there are more 
opportunities especially in terms of contribution to social security (see Hix & Noury, 2007). In 
this case, they can pick-up jobs and contribute positively in the society in which these 
opportunities are offered them.  The prolonged conflict in the Middle East is the main cause of a 
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huge influx of refugee into EU countries. Most of these countries absorbed a very significant 
number of people. In early July 2015, there were 13 837 people in the asylum procedure who 
were collected in the reception network while in December 16 of the same year, that number 
increased to 31 705. 
 If they are recognised after asylum, they get a refugee status which allows them to live in 
Belgium for an unlimited duration of time or get subsidiary protection which allows them to 
return to their country of origin once it is deemed safe. Either ways, they may be living in 
Belgium for more than five years because if it takes more than five years of subsidiary 
protection, they are granted a permanent stay. When a status is determined, the refugee may 
remain in a refugee camp for as long as two years during which a residence will be assigned or 
he or she may be allowed to look for a home (Vanhooren, 2015). This poses a huge challenge for 
the government, in terms of provision of housing and engagement of these refugees in activities 
that prepare them for (i) integration into the Belgian community after the five years or (ii) 
empower them with skills to be able to rebuild their countries upon return 
 Recent immigration trends in the EU have been the result of many factors ranging from 
the open border policy of many countries within the EU to political and economic instability in 
countries close to the EU.  Increased sensitivity to migration in EU countries over the past couple 
of years may in some instances be in response to increased immigration from within and outside 
the EU. In other cases, increased resentment towards immigrants may not be due to increased 
immigration but rather the result of rising nationalism. The graph below shows immigration 
trends in some EU countries over an 11 year period. 
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Source of Data: Eurostat Last update: 09.11.2015 Date of extraction: 11 Nov 2015  
   
3. Myths on Socio-economic Effects of Migrants/Refugees 
 The purpose of this paper is to critically assess the myths and facts in order to dispel 
misconceptions. The issue of immigration in Europe has been an ever debated issue over the 
years. The discussion popped-up in the late 1940s when Europe started receiving non-European 
immigrants. Most people feared these immigrants will not be assimilated and there was a risk of 
emerging subcultures. As a result, most western politicians and scholars made reference to the 
United States of America where immigrants from Africa, Latin America concentrate in the slums 
(ghettos) which is a breeding ground for criminality and riots (Lucassen, 2005). In addition, there 
have been many accounts of the media on clashes and social conflicts fuelled by immigrants in 
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Europe. Scholars suggest these clashes or conflicts are inevitable and can be expected (Smith & 
Krannich, 2000).  
 This section is engaged in four main strands, namely: loss of Christian values; threat to 
European liberal institutions; import of religious fundamentalism and cost in social security. 
First, the concern about loss of Christian cultural values has been substantially documented in 
contemporary European literature (Steven, 2009; Leustean & Madeley, 2009; Willaime, 2009). 
The literature is consistent with the concern of depleting Christian values on the continent. For 
example, according to the Pew Research Center (2011), recent statistics on regional distribution 
of the global Christian population show that the European share of Christians has decreased from 
66.3% in 1990 to 25.9% in 2010. While various reasons have been advanced for this decline (e.g. 
decreasing birth rates, development and insurance engineering that hedges against all types of 
risks), some policy circles are attributing this loss to ever increasing inward migration into 
Europe (see Hix & Noury, 2007).  
 Second, concerns have also been raised to articulate the position that the influx of 
migrants could threaten European liberal democratic institutions (Fukuyama, 2006). This thesis 
builds from the fact that immigrants are from regions that are characterised by cultures that are 
outdated European values, notably: autocratic institutions, female genital mutilation, violence 
against women, and punishment of children by beating. During the 20
th
 century, many European 
public figures amongst which included Belgium’s Dewinter F., France’s Marie Le Pen and 
Netherlands Fortuyn Pim expressed the fear that non-Western migrants in Europe especially the 
Muslims constitute a threat to European liberal democracy and suggested immigration into 
Europe be stopped for the protection of European culture and values (Lucassen, 2005). That is 
why European nations like Germany and Netherlands (for example) insist that non-European 
immigrants must adopt, accept and embrace liberal Western values before they can be granted 
residence permits (Cesari, 2009).  These measures are aimed at protecting the European system 
of liberal democracy. Third, some right-wing political parties are viewing the recent surge in 
migrants as a mechanism by which radical religious fundamentalism would be imported into the 
continent (Mounk, 2015). Most Muslims living in Europe today migrated to Europe to work after 
the Second World War. They brought with them their family later. 50 years on, the population of 
Muslims in Europe has increased to over 15 million inhabitants (Ramadan, 2013). Recently, 
Cesari (2009) has put the population at 425 million inhabitants which is approximately 5% of the 
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European Union. Some scholars have identified Islam as an obstacle to migrants’ integration 
process in the West (Foner & Alba, 2008) and Islam in the West is mostly associated with 
terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda (Cesari, 2009). When one looks back at the September 11 
2001 event in the US, one is forced to ask the question: does Europe await the same fate (Roy, 
2003). It is in this light that fears of radical fundamentalism have gripped the West.  
 Fourth, a thorny issue is the burden on social security that the migrants would engender 
(Hix & Noury, 2007). This concern is motivated by the apparent evidence that migrants do not 
pay taxes in the first few years upon arrival. On the contrary, they are substantially reliant on 
health and social services that are almost free of charge in some European countries.  
 According to Kicinger (2004), tax payers may not be willing to pay higher taxes to 
support immigrants living on social benefits if they do not share a common value. One of the 
myths that is widespread in many EU countries is that immigrants are taking away the jobs of the 
citizens and helping to push the wages down. Many surveys reveal that people believe migrants 
are an economic burden and contribute little to the local economies. A study conducted by the 
Pew Research Centre shows just what Europeans think about strengths and weaknesses of 
immigrants.  
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4. Facts on the Socio-Economic Effect of Migrants/Refugees 
This section debunks the engaged myths in the same chronological order. In essence, we use 
hard stylized facts and evidence from the literature to clarify myths surrounding the socio-
economic consequences of migration into the European Union. First, the concern about loss of 
Christian cultural values is lacking in substance because compared to relatively near historical 
époque, very few European citizens do go to Church in contemporary Europe (Veith, 2015). 
According to the narrative, immigration is not chiefly a reason for the decreasing European 
Christian population. On the contrary, immigrants from Africa and South America are 
substantially contributing to increasing the European Christian population.  Hence, the use of 
Christianity as an instrument by right-wing political parties to lobby against immigration is 
lacking in substance and not substantiated with significant statistics.  
              Second, the threat to European liberal institutions is falsifiable and statistically fragile 
because it is not substantiated with significant evidence. This is essentially because some 
countries in the South are enjoying liberal standards that are comparable to Northern European 
standards: Islamic and Christian countries alike. Some secular Moslem countries with exemplary 
democratic institutions include: Turkey and Senegal. Moreover, few immigrants have been 
documented to run for political offices in Europe (Østergaard‐Nielsen, 2003). Therefore, the 
position that immigration would potentially threaten institutions in Europe is debatable.  
         Third, the fact that a very insignificant proportion of the Moslem population aligns with 
Islamic fundamentalism invalidates the hypothesis on the importation of radical Islamic 
fundamentalism (Pargeter, 2006). The proportion of Muslins that are radicals is very low. The 
Western media plays a fundamental role in the increase of Islamophobia in the West. The media 
presents a one-sided view of conflicts in the Middle East to such an extent that the average 
person in the West feels only fear and insecurity at the mention of Muslim countries. War, 
Violence and Fanaticism are concepts that come to mind (Esposito & Voll, 1996). As Esposito 
and Voll pointed, the fear of religious fundamentalism being imported into Europe with the 
coming of migrants from Muslim countries has been propagated partly by the media.   There is 
the fear that Muslim population will take over Europe and make Europe an Islamic state. 
Research conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that the Muslim population increases by 
1% every decade. There was an increase from 4% in 1990 to 6% in 2010 and the population is 
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estimated to follow the same trend and increase only by 8% in 2030. This means the issue of 
Europe becoming a Muslim state is far from being a reality. 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the number of terrorist attacks that are religiously motivated in EU countries is very 
insignificant. Below is a research carried out by the Pew Research Institute from 2009 to 2013 
which reveals the percentage of these attacks on EU soil.  
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The above study reveals that in the course of a 5-year period (i.e. from 2009 to 2013), there has 
been less than 2% of religiously motivated attacks. This study only reveals that there are many 
other motives behind these attacks which are not necessarily religious. So why are all these 
attacks blamed on religious grounds? 
          Fourth, the concern about social security burden is relevant only in the short-term because 
of Europe’s ageing population. In essence, whereas there is apparent short term cost owing to 
training and integration of refugees, long-term benefits from employment and corresponding 
contribution to social security far outweigh short-term social costs (see Hix & Noury, 2007). 
According to the EU latest Ageing report, the population of the EU is projected to increase by 
2060: from 506.8 million in 2014 to about 517 million by 2060. Recent studies conducted by 
Eurostat reveal the European population is ageing and likely to pose challenges in the coming 
decades. The report published in May 15 2012 offers a glimpse on to the challenges the EU is 
likely to face. 
 Firstly, it projects a decline in the working age (15-64) from 67% to 56% by 2060 and 
projected an increase in those aged 65 and above from 17% to 30%. Public social expenditures 
on the old population such as health care, pension, long term care is projected to increase by 
about 13% of GDP by 2060. The study identified fertility, life expectancy and migration as 
possible factors that may influence the speed of the aging population. 
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 According to OECD report published in 2012, migrants have represented 70% of the 
work force in Europe over the past 10 years. The recent study also shows that migrants 
contribute more toward social security of the country and taxes than they receive in benefits. 
While most migrants are of the working active age group, this is not always the case with 
natives. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Migration has always been a sensitive issue especially when it concerns receiving 
countries. Being one of the issues that drive social, economic and political movements in many 
countries, it is important to critically assess the myths and facts behind migration in order to 
disperse misconceptions. These misconceptions are sometimes propagated and pushed forward 
by right wing political parties for political gains.  
As many continue to flee violence in Syria, Libya, the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, Iraq and 
Afghanistan for security purposes on the one hand and many countries South of the Sahara for 
politico-economic reasons on the other hand, the common denominator is that these immigrants 
are coming to search for better living standards. The purpose of this study has been to dispel 
some myths in order to improve socio-economic appraisal of the consequences of the recent 
surge of migrants into Europe. It is important to bear in mind that Europe is a continent with an 
ageing population and with the ever-increasing burdens of public pensions and public finances 
on the continent are coming under increasing strain. Many migrant workers are more likely to 
take jobs that resident workers would be reluctant to take. Therefore, from an exclusive 
economic perspective, European countries stand to gain from more migration. We have also 
shown that other associated myths do not withstand factual and empirical scrutiny, notably: (i) 
loss of Christian cultural values owing to a potential clash of civilisations with Europe’s 
historical/contemporary Christian values; (ii) threat to European liberal institutions; (iii) import 
of religious fundamentalism and (iv) substantial cost to social security. 
Evidences provided in this paper are based on data from published articles and 
documents from different organisations. Theoretical myths have been confronted with hard facts 
from exploratory and empirical scientific sources. In summary, the research found that the myths 
surrounding migrants are inconsistent, statistically fragile and lacking in empirical validity.   
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